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The Inner-Textuality of Qohelet’s Monologue 
Most of the book of Ecclesiastes contains words attributed to Qohelet, which are framed in 
1:2 and 12:8 by the nearly identical declarations, that “all is vanity”. In recent decades, the 
relationship between this material, the introductory 1:1, and the epilogue of 12:9-14 has been 
much discussed, with many scholars moving away from the earlier assumption that Qohelet’s 
words have been supplemented by a later editor or editors, and it is now common to talk in 
terms of a “frame narrator”, created as another voice, but as part of the same, single 
composition.
1
 Although they have not entirely disappeared, attempts to apportion the text as a 
whole to different redactors have also become much less common than they were a century 
ago, and many of the most important recent commentaries on Ecclesiastes treat it as, 
essentially, a unified work. That move is surely to be welcomed, not least because there was 
rarely any text-critical, linguistic or stylistic evidence that could be adduced for the 
re-attributions proposed by an earlier generation of commentators, who sought rather to 
re-build a text that was consistent with the message that each imputed to Qohelet. This 
methodologically problematic approach, not unknown elsewhere in biblical scholarship, 
resulted in a dismemberment and reconstruction of the book that was more akin to Dr 
Frankenstein’s hobby than to scientific vivisection.2 
It is only fair to say also, however, that what provoked much of this activity was a perception 
of tensions and of inconsistency within the book, and that this perception has long been 
shared even by those commentators who, for various different reasons, have been much less 
inclined to deny its unity. Indeed, the Talmud famously records the statement of Rabbi Judah, 
that “the sages sought to suppress the book of Qohelet on the grounds that its words are 
                                                          
1
 The principal inspiration behind this change has surely been Fox 1977, although some of the writers 
who have subsequently picked up the idea of a “frame narrative” do not appear to have adopted Fox’s 
point that the voice of the narrator is no more actually that of the author than is the voice of Qohelet. 
2
 The most infamous example is probably Siegfried 1898. It should be observed, in all fairness, both 
that the scholars who undertook such reconstructions saw themselves as repairing the mutilations 
wrought by redactors (see especially Haupt 1894, 254), and that some of the most egregious examples 
were inspired by a misguided idea that the book had been composed originally in metric verse (e.g, 
Zapletal 1905, Haupt 1905). 
inconsistent with each other”,3 and goes on to cite examples of Qohelet’s apparently different 
attitudes to joy, that are reconciled only by giving each of his statements separate, specific 
referents. If we are to deny ourselves the easy option of attributing such tensions to the work 
of redactors, or to the presence of more than one voice in the text (another popular way to 
deal with the problem)
4
 then we must acknowledge and engage with the problem that 
Qohelet’s words often stand in relationships with each other that are far from straightforward, 
and that this problem may have confronted readers of the book almost from the outset. These 
complexities, however, include not only the apparent contradictions, but also a number of 
correspondences which serve both to consolidate the material and, perhaps, to introduce 
qualifications or explanations. Qohelet is profoundly self-referential, and it is this aspect of 
his discourse that I shall try to examine here. 
Of course, the easiest elements of this to describe are the repetitive characterizations of 
situations and phenomena as לבה,5 and the repeated affirmations that one should take pleasure 
in what one does.
6
 To a great extent these embody, on the one hand, Qohelet’s analysis of the 
situation in which humans find themselves and, on the other, his reaction to that situation. 
Qohelet understands, reluctantly, that the very nature of the world and the very fact of human 
death combine to prevent humans from drawing any actual profit from their lives, so that they 
are constantly striving to catch hold of something that cannot be caught – grasping, as it were, 
at air. In that strife itself, however, there is pleasure to be found, and it is this pleasure which 
makes life worth living, if we can only accept it in place of more permanent gains. By 
repeating these ideas, almost as refrains, Qohelet draws together many different materials that 
are disparate in form and subject, in effect creating out of them a sort of argument by 
accumulation (Weeks 2012, 145-7). In broad terms, this is supported by aspects of the 
structure or arrangement of his speech, which begins by painting his picture of the world in 
                                                          
3
  הז תא הז ןירתוס וירבדש ינפמ b. abb. 30b. It is less commonly noted that the passage goes on to claim 
that suppression of the book of Proverbs was sought on the same grounds. 
4
 See Weeks 2012, 9-10. 
5
 See 1:14; 2:1, 11 bis, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 26; 4:4, 8, 16; 5: 9 (ET 5:10); 6:2, 9; 7:6; 8:10, 14. 
6
 As we shall see below, it is not straightforward to define precisely which passages do commend 
pleasure directly in the book, but note 3:10-13, 22; 5:17-19 (ET 18-20); 8:15; 9:7-10. 
the first chapter, moves on to an account of his personal struggles in the second, and then 
later closes with the movement from youth to death in the last chapter: there is, perhaps, no 
stronger evocation in ancient literature of death’s brutality and finality than in the climax of 
Qohelet’s words at 12:6-7. It is by no means improbable that many of his themes were quite 
conventional at the time of writing (Weeks 2012, 134-41), and not impossible that Qohelet 
has actually incorporated existing materials, but the specific and obvious repetitions bind 
them together as components of the broader point he is making. That is interesting, not least 
because such accumulation is uncommon – although not unparalleled– amongst comparable 
ancient Near Eastern texts.
7
 The very obtrusiveness of his repetitions, however, tends to draw 
attention away from other elements that are no less interesting and important. 
Although they are not so easy to describe, it is, I think, the so-called “contradictions” that 
provide a better starting-point for any examination of Qohelet’s inner-textuality, and perhaps 
especially those that seem almost set up to attract attention – not least the statements about 
joy which were picked up by the Talmud. Whilst many of the contradictions attributed to 
Qohelet seem not to be direct contradictions, but perceived failures to associate ideas in the 
way that particular readers expect, these statements are, on the face of it, genuinely difficult 
to reconcile even without reference to other themes. The passages cited and contrasted in the 
rabbinic discussion are: 
7:3 קחשמ סעכ בוט, “Vexation is better than laughter” 
2:2a ללוהמ יתרמא קוחשל, “I said of laughter ‘(it is) ללוהמ’…” 
8:15 החמשה תא ינא יתחבשו, “I commended joy” 
2:2b   הז המ החמשלוהשע , “… and of joy ‘what does it do?’” 
From the subsequent interpretation, it is apparent that the difficult ללוהמ in 2:2 is regarded by 
the rabbinic commentators as something good (probably connected with “praise”),8 so that 
                                                          
7
 The best parallel is the Demotic instruction on Papyrus Insinger; cf. Weeks 2012, 145. 
8
 ללוהמ is probably to be linked with the term תוללוה, which is used a number of times in the book 
(1:17; 2:12; 7:25; 9:3; 10:13), and indicates madness, or better, perhaps, mindlessness. The Talmud, 
the Talmud draws out two separate contradictions here, between Qohelet’s disparagement 
and praise of laughter and between his commendation and condemnation of joy. Most 
modern commentators, of course, interpret 2:2a negatively, in parallel with the statement 
about joy in the second part of the verse, but all the same, it would be difficult to deny that 
there seems to be a contradiction between Qohelet’s attitudes to joy in 8:15 and 2:2, and this 
contradiction is reinforced if we take account of, e.g., 7:4, which associates joy with folly, 
and 2:26, which sees it as something granted by God. 
There seems to be a similar tension between some of Qohelet’s statements about death. In 
terms rather similar to those of 8:15, he apparently declares in 4:2-3 that he commends or has 
commended (the meaning and form of the verb are problematic)
9
 those who have already 
died over those who are still alive, but considers those not yet born at all to be better off than 
both. The second part of that claim is not inherently difficult: for Qohelet, the living of life 
involves a cost that cannot adequately be recouped, and so to remain unborn avoids a loss. In 
7:1, furthermore, Qohelet apparently claims that, just as fame is better than fine lotion, so is 
the day of death better than the day of one’s birth, so the commendation of death in 4:2 does 
not stand alone. In 9:4-5, however, Qohelet appears to say quite the opposite. Although the 
traditional understanding that Qohelet thinks “a living dog is better than a dead lion” may 
misrepresent the sense of the difficult Hebrew in 9:4,
10
 and we should not presuppose that in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
however, has read it as equivalent to MT ללהמ in 2 Sam 22:4; Ps 18:4, where it is the pual participle 
from ללה, “praise”, and means something like “praiseworthy”.  
9
 Although the context demands a main verb, חבש is pointed as an infinitive absolute, a form rarely 
used that way. MT has been defended by many scholars, but the evidence of the versions points 
strongly to an original reading יתחבש, as at 8:15. Neither in Hebrew nor in Aramaic does the verb 
elsewhere come close to the sense “consider fortunate”, and the most natural understanding of 4:2-3 is 
that Qohelet is claiming to have reacted to his observations in 4:1 by congratulating the dead for being 
dead, rather than the living for being alive, but to have saved his heartiest congratulations for those 
who had never been born at all, and so avoided having to see all the bad things that happen in the 
world. 
10
 There are many difficulties in 9:4, which RSV renders “But he who is joined with all the living has 
hope, for a living dog is better than a dead lion.” Among the significant problems for this traditional 
understanding are (1) Despite G ἐλπίς, the idea that  ןוחטב means “hope” as an emotion is hard to 
9:5 Qohelet necessarily regards the knowledge of coming death as better than the ignorance 
of the dead, he certainly goes on to contrast the disconnection of the dead, and their inability 
to gain anything more from the world, with the ability of the living to find pleasure. 
Elsewhere, furthermore, he encourages his readers to avoid death (7:15-18), and it certainly 
does not seem to be the case that he consistently believes it better for humans to be dead than 
alive. 
To these apparent tensions within Qohelet’s opinions about joy and about death we could 
certainly add the mixed feelings that he apparently displays toward wisdom, albeit with less 
direct contradiction, and many commentators have made their own lists of apparent 
inconsistencies. It should be said also, however, that most of the difficulties that surround all 
these “contradictions” can be resolved without too much exegetical ingenuity. When it comes 
to joy, for instance, it seems likely that Qohelet ultimately commends it not because he has 
changed his mind about its lack of utility, but because, after the experiences recounted in 
chapter 2, he no longer regards utility as the sole criterion for value. In the case of wisdom, 
there is a genuine ambivalence: it is both a useful tool and, especially when taken too far, a 
potential source of misery (Weeks 2012, 96-101). Even when it comes to death, the context 
of Qohelet’s statements may be important: the initial verses of chapter 7 seem concerned 
principally to draw out ironically the miserable aspect of wisdom, rather than to speak about 
death itself, whilst in chapter 4 Qohelet is concerned with the futility that he sees in the lives 
of others, not with the importance of living one’s life well, which becomes the theme of 
chapter 9. There are even ways to link these various ideas together: the misery that wisdom 
inspires by illuminating the helpless progress of every human towards death is also, perhaps, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
substantiate, and Jastrow cites only y. Ber. 13b, where 9:4 is being interpreted to mean that the 
possibility of avoiding damnation exists right up until it is too late for the wicked to repent; we might 
say that it is used, at least in that passage, as equivalent to the English “there is hope for him”, but not 
for “he has hope”. More commonly, the word means “confidence”. (2) It is easier to construe לא with 
רבחי (which it commonly follows) than to take it as expressing possession. (3) The ל on בלכל has to be 
explained as an uncharacteristic and wholly pointless emphatic lamed unless we read (like 
Symmachus) “it is better for a live dog” instead of “a live dog is better”, which also addresses the 
problematic position of אוה but changes the sense. It seems very likely that the text is corrupt, and 
very possible that Qohelet is describing the complacency of the living, not offering his own view of 
the matter. 
a potential stimulus to joy, when one appreciates the need to grasp life before death 
intervenes. 
The important point here, however, is not that we can dissolve the tensions ourselves, but that 
Qohelet himself makes no explicit attempt to do so. The contradictions are not juxtaposed 
(and the author’s purpose, therefore, is not apparently just to relativize the various points, as 
is probably the case in Prov 26:4-5); for evidence that they are real and obvious, however, we 
need only to observe the reactions of readers down the ages. If this is not mere clumsiness or 
inconsistency within the author’s own mind, then it would seem to represent a sort of strategy 
that is, arguably, consistent with other aspects of the book: readers are not led down a smooth 
path that persuades them of Qohelet’s views, but across a terrain littered with obstacles. Few 
readers would be likely to share Qohelet’s views on every issue, and some are notoriously 
problematic, but his inconsistencies mean that readers are liable to stub their toes on different 
viewpoints even within his account of single, specific issues. In more general terms, the 
author’s purpose need not concern us for the moment: what the “contradictions”, and the 
perception of those contradictions, highlight is the way in which the book tends to scatter its 
discussion of given themes across many chapters, and yet apparently cross-references each 
appearance to the rest with sufficient clarity that readers make their own, mental 
juxtapositions. 
We can see something similar in some quite different passages. In 9:13-16, for example, 
Qohelet tells the story of the wise man who saves his city,
11
 apparently to make not just the 
point that wisdom may be powerful – the aim stated in the first verse – but also the point that 
the wise may not receive the recognition that they would seem to deserve. The next few 
verses also treat wisdom in this way: giving, as it were, with one hand, and taking with the 
other. The way in which he tells the story, however, invites us to read it in the context of 
some earlier passages, not least 4:13-14, where we have already encountered a king 
contrasted with a  ןכסמ דליםכחו , “a youth, poor (or common) and wise”: the wise man who 
stands before the king in 9:15 is םכח ןכסמ שיא, “a man, poor (or common) and wise”; the 
                                                          
11
 We need not go into the vexed question of whether he actually saved the city, or merely might have 
saved it if anybody had remembered him – although I think that the context strongly suggests the 
former. 
word ןכסמ appears nowhere else in the book (or, for that matter, in the Bible).12 The point of 
the saying in chapter 4 was that such a poor, wise youth is better than an old king, because he 
has so much more potential to improve his own situation, so the allusion in chapter 9 serves, 
perhaps, both to emphasize the failure of the wise man to secure such improvement, and to 
qualify the earlier saying; the context established by the previous verses is that people do not 
always receive what they deserve or know what is coming, and 9:11, indeed, has already 
mentioned that the wise may lack food or wealth.
13
 Qohelet also takes the opportunity to pick 
up his much earlier points, from 1:11, that humans have no memory of the past, and from 
2:16, that a wise man will be forgotten just like a fool. It is interesting to observe, in fact, that 
9:15 uses a very unusual expression – רכז אל םדאו, literally, “and a human does not recall” –  
to describe how the wise man is forgotten, which, even allowing for broader uses of םדא in 
late literature, makes this forgetfulness seem universal.
14
 Through clear verbal allusions to a 
number of things that he has said earlier, Qohelet uses his story to draw into a new context 
some of the claims and issues that have already been laid out on the table: in doing so, he 
asserts continuity within his discourse, but also forces some qualification and re-evaluation of 
those claims. 
                                                          
12
 Gordis 1968, 243, does try to find it in Isa 40:20. where he thinks that ן ָּכֻסְמ has been wrongly 
vocalized, but the strongest evidence for its existence in earlier Hebrew is the use of תֻנ ֵּכְסִמ in Deut 
8:9 (cf. McNeile 1904, 66). It may well have been derived from Akkadian, directly or indirectly, but 
we should be wary of assuming therefore that it conveys only the Akkadian implications of social, 
rather than economic status, as does Seow (1997, 183). 
13
 The link between 4:13 and 9:13-16 is explored briefly in Rudman 1997, 72-3, who believes that 
both passages convey a message about the ultimate powerlessness of the poor. 
14
 Although, of course, any reader who is sufficiently alert might wonder how it is that, in the face of 
such an erasure from history, Qohelet himself recalls this wise man, and it is the recollection of his 
earlier statements about memory that make it difficult to assume he is just acting blithely here as an 
omniscient narrator (so, e.g. Seow 1997, 310; Fox 1999, 299). This is the most fundamental objection, 
I think, to ideas that the story is supposed to reflect some familiar historical event (as most recently 
Barbour 2012, 123-35): the very familiarity would undermine the point that Qohelet is trying to make. 
Elsewhere, Qohelet often seems quite clearly to be alluding to what he has said already, but 
more obviously to be changing the meaning. After famously establishing in 3:1, for instance, 
that םימשה תחת ץפח לכל תעו ןמז לכל, “(there is) for everything an occasion, and a time for 
every matter beneath heaven”, he goes on to evoke this vocabulary shortly afterwards in 3:17, 
and then again later in 8:6. In both cases, the ץפח לכל תע, “a time for every matter”, is now 
associated strongly with judgment, which is certainly not what it meant in 3:1-8. It seems 
apparent that Qohelet wants us to understand his statements about the inevitability of 
judgment in connection with his quasi-deterministic statements in 3:1-8, despite the fact that 
these two aspects of his thought are amongst the most difficult in the book to reconcile.
15
 It is 
not clear, however, why he wants to make this association. Is it an act of rhetorical bravado, 
attempting to conceal the problem, or an invitation to notice it? 3:17, indeed, could even be 
read as an extraordinary attempt to prove the reality of judgement syllogistically on the basis 
of 3:1, if we read the יכ as explanatory: “God will act as judge, since (there is) a time for 
every matter – and about everything which is achieved there.” In other words, if everything 
has its time, then judgment must have its time. This verse has been a popular candidate 
amongst commentators for excision, along with other references to divine judgment in the 
book, but if we are to allow that Qohelet tries to maintain the reality of judgment within a 
world where human actions serve divine purposes, then 3:17 and 8:6 clearly play some 
important role in his attempt to align them. 
So far, we have observed a number of ways in which Qohelet uses allusions not to 
consolidate but to change or qualify what he is saying, and it is important to bear this in mind 
when we look at two groups of very similar statements: the first, Qohelet’s question about 
profit, posed in 1:3 and evoked in 3:9 and 5:15; the second, his sayings about human good in 
2:24; 3:12, 22; 8:15. In each of these series, there are small changes of wording. So, in the 
first: 
1:3  מולמע לכב םדאל ןורתי ה   
3:9   למע אוה רשאב השועה ןורתי המ  
                                                          
15
 I have examined the question in a forthcoming article, where I argue that, to some extent at least, 
Qohelet’s assertions about judgment are forced upon him by his context. 
5:15 ל למעיש ול ןורתי המורחו   
From 1:3 and 5:15 it seems clear that profit accrues to (ל) someone, and from 1:3 and 3:9 that 
it is acquired by (ב) doing something; of course, we may allow some syntactical leeway, but 
since Qohelet is clearly quoting himself, the absence of ל is strange in 3:9 if השועה ןורתי is 
supposed to mean “the profit to the worker”, and the absence of ב in 5:15 suggests that the 
profit is not acquired by working for the wind. In each case, incidentally, the Greek, which is 
generally faithful in such matters, supports MT, and there are no strong text-critical grounds 
for emendation: indeed, we would usually expect texts to grow closer through assimilation in 
such cases, not to diverge. When we see from 5:8, furthermore, that Qohelet elsewhere 
probably uses ןורתי in a construct relationship to indicate the profit from something,16 then it 
seems likely, despite the overwhelming tendency of commentators to ignore the change, that 
3:9 is asking a new question, not about what humans can gain, but about what can be gained 
from them, given the situation described in 3:1-15. His answer is still, of course, “nothing”. 
In 5:15, on the other hand, the point is clearly that an individual who leaves the world just as 
he arrived can have gained nothing, but the failure is probably not “from” working for the 
wind: as is more generally acknowledged, the force of ש + the yiqtol here is probably “that he 
should work”, or perhaps, “that he should have worked”. Correspondingly, his failure to 
make any gain is not just a consequence of the particular work that he chose to do, and 
Qohelet is not simply repeating his question, but relating different issues to the same theme 
by varying the wording of it. 
Something similar seems to be true in the second series: 
2:24  לכאיש םדאב בוט ןיא 
3:12 חומשל םא יכ םב בוט ןיא 
                                                          
16
 Of course, 5:18 is a notorious crux, but it is noteworthy that all of the ancient versions take the 
expression here to imply profit from the land. The popular idea that the verse is talking about a king 
being an advantage to a land is impossible for many reasons, not the least of them being that ןורתי 
does not mean “advantage”. 
3:22 םדאה חמשי רשאמ בוט ןיא 
8:15 לוכאל םא יכ שמשה תחת םדאל בוט ןיא 
After the initial בוט ןיא, “there is no good”, these statements contain some common elements: 
three of the four refer directly to “the human”, םדאה, and the suffix on םב in 3:12 probably 
refers back to the םדא ינב of 3:10;17 in 2:24 and 8:15, there are references to eating and 
drinking, whilst 3:12 and 3:22 both refer to rejoicing or taking pleasure (חמש). There is no 
doubt that they can legitimately be called a group, even if they relate to other statements as 
well (cf. 2:3; 5:17; 6:12). However, there are also differences: 3:12 and 8:15, for example, 
have “there is no good except”, whilst 3:22 has “there is no good greater than that”. Most 
strikingly, 2:24 and 3:12 have “there is no good in (humans)”, 8:15 has “there is no good for 
(humans)”, and 3:22 has “there is nothing better than that (humans)”. These differences are 
probably original, despite efforts to emend the text, and despite the fact that they give 2:24 
and 3:12, in particular, a significantly different sense. This sense is reinforced for 2:24-25, in 
fact, by Qohelet’s further observation that the ability to eat is in some way associated with 
divine action (and so not with some goodness inherent in each human), and 3:12 by a 
comparable statement in 3:13, that “every person who eats and drinks and takes pleasure in 
his business - this is a dispensation from God.” Again, Qohelet uses similar expressions to 
group a series of verses with each other, and to make it clear that they all correspond to the 
same theme: again, though, the wording is varied so that, in this case, his own conclusions 
about the best that humans can achieve for themselves are tied strongly to his perception that 
even this relies on, and may be constrained by, divine permission rather than objective 
individual worth. 
In these various examples, then, of the poor, wise man, of the “time for every matter”, and of 
the statements about profit and good, we can see that Qohelet likes to create verbal 
associations between certain of his observations and statements, but not simply because he 
                                                          
17
 Contra BHQ, which takes it to refer to what God has made, considered collectively. There is 
singular/plural variation in the context, but the suffix on םבלב in the previous verse certainly refers to 
humans, and it is difficult to see why the writer would have confused matters by giving the suffix here 
a different referent. 
wants them to be understood as re-affirmations of the same idea. If, in a more general way, 
the “contradictions” serve to draw attention to the tensions within his discourse, these more 
precise verbal correspondences might be said to highlight, not through repetition so much as 
through variation, some of the correspondences and nuances in that discourse which might 
otherwise be missed. When we set these examples, though, alongside the accumulated 
statements about לבה or joy, or such other features as the rhetorical “Who can take someone 
to see/inform someone/explain the future?” questions of 3:22; 6:12; 8:7; and 10:4, which 
have their own variations but no obvious shift in sense, then it becomes apparent that 
repetition and self-reference in the monologue do not represent some single, simple 
technique. We cannot say that Qohelet is always introducing new ideas by such means, any 
more than we can say that he is always trying to consolidate points that he has already made. 
Perhaps the most important point about this aspect of Qohelet’s speech, then, is not that he 
uses such allusions in particular to mark congruence, correspondence or dissonance in his 
thought, but that he uses them so much, for so many purposes. The obvious and explicit 
repetitions in the book, such as the mottoes of 1:2 and 12:8, the times of 3:2-8, or the almost 
formulaic condemnations as לבה are simply the most obvious manifestations of something 
much more widespread. Qohelet can seem sometimes like a dog with a bone, tossing around 
and gnawing at his favourite ideas or expressions, but never quite able to leave them alone. 
This consolidates his speech, distinguishes it from the looser constructions of much other 
didactic literature, and presents what has always been the strongest evidence against theories 
of dialogue or interpolation within the discourse. Rather than just thinking in source- or 
redaction-critical terms, however, I wonder, finally, if we should not take more seriously the 
effect that they have on our perception of Qohelet himself. 
Of course, the history of the book’s interpretation has persuaded most readers to think in 
terms of a regal figure, either a proud Solomon in his prime, or a humbled, penitent king of 
Judah. Those who have paid less regard to that supposed persona have often seen someone 
more intellectual, philosophical or academic – an “old professor”, to borrow from the title of 
Eichhorn 1963. If we permit ourselves to believe, however, that the author of the book may 
be creating for us a real character, with his own experiences, and his own ways of thinking 
and talking, then we should not be so ready to pull stereotypes off the rack. Qohelet talks in a 
register of Hebrew that is probably colloquial or dialectal (Weeks 2012, 39-42), and he mixes 
clever sayings and turns of phrase with passages that seem clumsy or barely coherent; he 
draws extensively on his own experience, regards himself as incomparably intelligent, and 
never once relies explicitly on the views of others. He has made himself rich, furthermore, 
and reckons human life using the vocabulary of the balance-sheet, barely able to let go of his 
desire for some material return from it. What he says, and the way he talks, offer us a vivid 
portrayal of Qohelet as a man, and it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that his constant 
repetition and self-allusion are, at least in part, aspects of this portrayal. Whether he is 
examining the question of human profit from every possible angle, eliciting another instance 
of לבה long after he has made his point, or simply going back to issues that he has already 
covered, Qohelet comes across as a man who cannot move on. Self-reference in Qohelet’s 
monologue may well have a role in the composition of the book, and an important part to 
play in the ways that the author encourages his audience to think about what Qohelet is 
saying. It is surely also used, however, to show this audience just how trapped Qohelet has 
become within his own discourse and frame of reference, unable to move beyond the 
assumptions, questions and themes that obsess him, and around which he continues to circle 
without ever seeming to find the joy that he commends to others.  
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